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  Goulder and Stavins (2010) have provided a clear and useful framework for thinking 
about the complex interactions between comprehensive climate bills under consideration by the 
U.S. Congress and existing state regulations already in place, planned, or contemplated.  In this 
note I make four brief points, some new, some adding emphasis to points in their chapter: (1) 
The core of their analysis lends itself to a simple, two-by-two diagrammatic exposition; (2) Their 
analysis is more general than their paper suggests; (3) The justifications they explore for 
continued coexistence of overlapping state and federal regulations are exceptions that prove the 
rule; and (4) As they note, many of the problems caused by those overlapping regulations would 
be avoided by a federal pollution tax in lieu of cap-and-trade. 
(1) A two-by-two diagram 
 
  Goulder and Stavins identify the two key criteria for whether and how state and federal 
climate laws would interact: how much abatement is required (stringency) and how many 
polluting sectors are covered by the legislation (comprehensiveness).   That yields four possible 
outcomes, depicted in figure 1 below.
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  The upper left-hand corner (box (A)) of figure 1 depicts the simplest case, where the 
federal policy covers more of the economy with more stringent legislation.  For example, the 
northeastern states' RGGI requires a 10 percent emissions reduction by 2018 from the utility 
sector alone, while the Waxman-Markey bill that passed the U.S. House of Representatives in 
2009 would require a 17 percent reduction by 2020 from numerous sources including utilities, 
large manufacturers, refiners, and natural gas sales.  The federal law, if enacted, would cover 
more sources more stringently than RGGI.  The state-level regulation’s environmental effects 
would effectively be made irrelevant by the federal law. 
  Box (B) of figure 1 depicts the hypothetical case where the federal law covers more 
sectors, but the state law is more stringent.  Suppose, for example, that a version of Waxman-
Markey passed into law but required less than a 10 percent reduction.  In that case, utilities in the 





other states or sectors.  This interaction between state and federal laws can be seen in two ways: 
the federal law enables leakage of GHG emissions from the Northeast utility sector to other 
states and sectors, and the state law distorts the cost-effectiveness of the federal cap-and-trade 
system. 
  Box (C) depicts the hypothetical case where the state law is both more stringent and more 
comprehensive.  Imagine a weak federal law covering only the utility sector, and a strict state 
law covering multiple sectors.  Here the state's utilities could sell federal emissions allowances 
they accumulate as a consequence of meeting the strict state standard to sources in other states, 
but not to other sectors within the state.   Like box (B), there is leakage here, but only across 
state lines, not across sectors within the state.  Also like box (B), the interaction can be seen in 
two ways: the federal law enables leakage of GHG emissions from the utility sector, and the state 
law distorts the cost-effectiveness of the federal cap-and-trade system.   
  The most complex case is depicted in box (D), where the federal law is more stringent, 
but the state law is more comprehensive.  Imagine a strict federal law governing only utilities, 
combined with a weaker state law covering more sectors.  If we presume that the state standard 
cannot be met entirely by abatement within the federal sector (utilities), then this case reverses 
the outcome in the other boxes.  The federal policy undermines the cost-effectiveness of the 
broader state cap-and-trade policy.  And the state policy undermines the emissions reductions 
mandated by the federal policy, by enabling leakage across sectors within the state.   
  Although all of this is hypothetical given the current state of climate legislation in the 
U.S. Congress, it illustrates how complex the potential interactions can be. 
 
(2) Goulder and Stavins generalized 
 
  The analysis in Goulder and Stavins is in some ways more general than they describe.  In 
chapter 8 of this volume (Levinson, 2010), I discuss interactions between cap-and-trade climate 
legislation and other more traditional, non-market-based regulations that either predate the cap-
and-trade rules or may be enacted alongside them.  Retitle figure 1 in Goulder and Stavins so that 
the left graph is labeled "Renewable Energy Standards" instead of "Greener States", and the right 
graph is labeled "Energy Efficiency Standards" instead of "Other States."  A cap-and-trade 
system will equalize marginal abatement costs between the two sources of abatement, renewable 
energy and efficiency, just as it would between greener and other states.  But if a renewable 
energy standard coexists alongside the cap-and-trade, then its effect depends on whether the 
standard mandates less renewable energy than would be incentivized by the cap-and-trade permit 
price, or more.  If the renewable energy standard is less stringent, it is effectively irrelevant in the 
same way that a less stringent, less comprehensive state regulation is irrelevant.  Given the cap-
and-trade permit price, utilities will opt to exceed the renewable standard.  On the other hand, if 
the renewable energy standard is more stringent, it raises abatement from renewable energy, 
allowing allowances to be sold to energy efficiency sources (leakage), and raises the cost of 
abating GHG emissions without generating any more abatement – similar to the effects of a more 
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(3) Justifications for coexisting federal and state laws 
  
  The overarching conclusion of Goulder and Stavins's chapter and my chapter in this 
volume is that the coexistence of the two sets of regulations (federal and state, cap-and-trade and 
traditional mandate) is either irrelevant or costly.  As I do in my chapter, Goulder and Stavins 
also devote space to identifying cases where that coexistence may be justified.  My own 
impression of those justifications is that in both cases they appear more as exceptions that prove 
the rule rather than general reasons to enact both types of policies. 
  Goulder and Stavins provide three general justifications.  First, states may address other 
market failures, such as the fact that landlords and tenants have incomplete incentives to 
conserve energy.  If states have a local-knowledge advantage, regulations addressing building 
construction or appliance standards may be best set and administered by the states rather than the 
federal government.  Of course, as they note that argument does not apply to large-scale GHG 
abatement programs such as RGGI.  Second, states are often described as laboratories of 
regulatory experimentation.  Perhaps state-level experimentation will eventually lead to a better-
designed federal climate policy.  And third, state policies like RGGI and California's A.B.32 may 
provide the political pressure that leads to comprehensive federal policy.  Again, as Goulder and 
Stavins note, these justifications provide reasons for state policies eventually to be replaced by 
federal policy, not to coexist.   
 
(4) Conclusion, and an advantage of emissions taxes over cap-and-trade. 
 
  Finally, the discussions in Goulder and Stavins and in my chapter illustrate an important 
advantage a GHG emissions tax would have over a cap-and-trade system.  Economists have long 
argued that social problems like GHG emissions can most cost-effectively be solved by 
internalizing the externalities – placing a "price on carbon" in common parlance.  That price can 
arise from two possible mechanisms: an emissions tax or a cap-and-trade system.  The two share 
common advantages.  Both would internalize externalities.  Both would motivate research and 
development into alternative energy, conservation, and carbon sequestration.  And most 
importantly, both would level the playing field across potential sources of GHG reduction, 
ensuring that market forces determine that whatever reduction occurs comes at the lowest 
possible total cost. 
  One important difference, however, between an emissions tax and cap-and-trade involves 
the logistical difficulty of introducing the policy in the first place.  Policymakers considering a 
new, comprehensive, federal GHG cap-and-trade system face a dilemma with respect to sources 
already covered by other regulations – state regulations or other traditional regulatory mandates.  
If the federal policy excludes those sources, they lose the cost-effectiveness – the "level playing 
field" – of the comprehensive cap-and-trade.  But federal policy covers those already-abating 
sources, and unless 100 percent of the allowances are auctioned, policymakers must decide how 
much credit to give sources for abatement that has already occurred, whether voluntary or 
mandated, raising issues of fairness with respect to sources that may have postponed abatement 
knowing the comprehensive federal system was coming.   
  As Goulder and Stavins note, an emissions tax would avoid some of this dilemma.  A 
federal GHG tax could in theory be levied without concern about preexisting state or federal 
regulations.  Those sources that have already abated GHG emissions would simply have an early 4 
 
lead on reacting to the new tax.  Where the other state or federal policies result in more 
abatement than the federal tax would have generated, that excess abatement cannot leak to other 
states or sectors, because all sources must pay the federal emissions tax rate.
2 
  In sum, Goulder and Stavins have cleverly and clearly framed the key issues in thinking 
about how proposed federal climate legislation may interact with existing state regulations, and 
that framework illustrates one of the key advantages held by emissions taxes over cap-and-trade 
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a)  State can state meet 
state std. with federal 
sector. 
b) States  cannot. 
(C) 
  Leakage to other states. 
 Cost  ineffective. 
 States  ineffective. 
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